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Drawing on earlier work on the conceptual structure of dignity, this paper will suggest a 
particular type of connectedness between vulnerability and human dignity; namely, that the 
³organizing idea´ of human dignity is the idea of a particular sort of ethical response to 
universal human vulnerability. It is common ground among many, if not all, approaches to 
ethics that vulnerability requires us to respond ethically. Here, I argue that human dignity is 
distinctive among ethical values in that it values us because of, rather than in spite of, or 
regardless of, our universal vulnerability. The term ³dignity´ is used synonymously with 
³human dignity´ here, since an investigation of the dignity of non-human entities forms no 
part of the present examination.  
 
1. Introduction: the messy appeal of dignity 
 
The idea of dignity is acknowledged to have ³widespread psychological and intellectual 
resonance´1 as well as a ³deep emotional appeal´;2 as an idea, dignity seems important, not 
only in the positive sense of being ³something that virtually all people want´,3 but also in the 
negative sense that many of us feel ³horror at the violation of human dignity´.4 Of course, 
dignity also has considerable legal impact, given its presence either in or behind the texts of 
so many supranational documents on human rights.  Nevertheless, the idea of human dignity 
is often the target for criticism, much of it immoderate and derisive, from those who deny that 
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1 ĂǀŝĚ: ?DĂƚƚƐŽŶĂŶĚ^ƵƐĂŶ' ?ůĂƌŬ ? ‘,ƵŵĂŶĚŝŐŶŝƚǇŝŶĐŽŶĐĞƉƚĂŶĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?Policy Sciences (published 
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3 Ibid. 
4 EŝŬŽůĂƵƐ<ŶŽĞƉĨĨůĞƌĂŶĚDĂƌƚŝŶK ?DĂůůĞǇ ? ‘,ƵŵĂŶĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ PƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝǀĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞĂŶĚĂďƐŽůƵƚĞǀĂůƵĞ ? ?
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2 
 
such a vague, contested concept deserves any place in our ethical, and particularly, our legal 
reasoning.5  
Even its supporters acknowledge that the concept is mercurial, and it is not unusual to 
hear even proponents of human dignity describe it as ³intrinsically ambiguous´.6  In the 
Omega case, Advocate-General Christine Stix-Hackl acknowledged that, notwithstanding 
that ³respect for human dignity does«constitute an integral part of the general legal tenets of 
Community law and a criterion and requirement of the legality of acts under Community 
law´7, nevertheless ³there is hardly any legal principle more difficult to fathom in law than 
that of human dignity´.8  Similarly, Mattson and Clark write, in an article which argues 
strongly for a ³commonwealth of human dignity´, that ³[h]uman dignity is in such disarray 
that it does not provide even a minimally stable frame for global discourse and action. Much 
about this idea remains implicit or even contradictory, in the service of diverse and 
sometimes contra-dignity ends´.9 
One way of trying to clarify what dignity means is to attempt to come up with a 
typology of uses of dignity. Several such typologies have been attempted in recent writings 
about dignity, and within these, although certain types appear only in one typology, at least 
three occur repeatedly. One recurring type, and perhaps the most widespread, is the use of 
dignity to denote the intrinsic worth of human beings. This is the sense in which dignity 
SURYLGHV ³a metaphysical justification for human rights and duties´,10 and Rendtorff makes 
the important point that this use of dignity refers to worth that is not only intrinsic, but 
fundamentally equal.11 Nordenfeld calls this ³the dignity of Menschenwürde´,12 which he 
says is ³completely different´ from other types of dignity in that it is possessed equally by all 
human beings for no other reason than that they are human beings.13 He observes that most 
modern writers follow Kant, who ³sought to derive man¶s dignity from autonomy and 
                                                          
5 ^ĞĞ ?Ğ ?Ő ? ?ĂŐĂƌŝĐ ?D ?ŶĚůůĞŶ ?: ? ? ‘dŚĞsĂĐƵŽƵƐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨŝŐŶŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Journal of Human Rights, 5: 257-
 ? ? ? ?DĂĐŬůŝŶ ?Z ? ?  ‘ŝŐŶŝƚǇ ŝƐĂhƐĞůĞƐƐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ? ?British Medical Journal (2003) 327:1419-1420; and Pinker, S., 
 ‘dŚĞ^ƚƵƉŝĚŝƚǇŽĨŝŐŶŝƚǇ ? ?The New Republic, May 2008, accessed at http://www.tnr.com/article/the-stupidity-
dignity 
6 ŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶǇŬ ? ‘>ĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚĚĞĚŝŐŶŝƚé et le droit des sciences de la vie: une valeur symbolique et dynamique au 
ĐŽĞƵƌĚĞůĂĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĐŝĂůĞĚĞů ?ŚŽŵŵĞ ? ?International Journal of Bioethics 2010 21(4) 69-81 at 76 ( ‘ůĂ 
dignité reste intrinsèquemenƚƵŶĞŶŽƚŝŽŶĂŵďŝŐƵģ ? ?)  
7 Omega Speilhallen und Automatenaufstellung Gmbh v Oberburgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR 
I-9609) paragraph 90 
8 Ibid.paragraph 74 
9 Mattson and Clark, op. cit. n1 
10 Ibid. 
11 Rendtorff, 237 
12 Nordenfeld, 77 
13 Ibid., 77-78 
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rationality,´14 in sourcing this kind of dignity in ³capacities crucial to humans´ such as the 
ability to think, or reason, the ability to reflect, and the ability to self-determine.15 Rendtorff 
identifies as separate ³uses´ of dignity things like: (i) respect for moral agency, (ii) the idea 
of human beings as ends-in-themselves / as ³beyond price´ and not to be commercialized, 
and (iii) respect for the ability of human beings to self-determinH DQG ³FUHDWH WKHLU RZQ
GHVWLQ\´;16 nevertheless, all of these are aspects which, according to the dominant Kantian 
analysis, are incorporated within the idea of ³intrinsic worth´. As will be shown later, 17 
accounts that purport to ascribe intrinsic worth (whether it be described as dignity, or 
personhood, or something else) on the basis of features or capacities (usually cognitive 
capacities) that are supposedly ³crucial to humans´ fall into paradox when they insist on 
ascribing such worth to all human beings on this basis, notwithstanding that not all human 
beings possess the features or capacities that are taken to be relevant. At this stage, however, 
the prevalence of such accounts is merely noted.  
Another recurring type is the use of ³dignity´ to signify ³dignified character´ or 
³dignified conduct´; in other words, to praise or recommend certain types of actions or 
personal qualities. Mattson and Clark, for example, note the use of dignity to denote 
³virtuous comportment or behaviour´;18 the same idea is expressed variously by other writers 
in terms of ³grace, bearing and aristocracy´19 or ³GLJQLILHGFKDUDFWHU«DSHUVRQDOLW\GLVSRVHG
to respect the moral law´.20 This type of use also seems to be what Thiel means by ³ethical 
dignity´.21 Mattson and Clark go into some detail in explaining precisely what they think the 
important elements in a ³dignified character´ are, all of which are reducible, essentially, to 
the idea of a ³temperate orientation´.22 There is clear overlap between this second major use-
type and the earliest uses of ³dignitas´ to connote rank or merit (though Nordenfeld 
distinguishes them).23 
                                                          
14 ^ƚĞƉŚĞŶZŝůĞǇ ? ‘,ƵŵĂŶĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ PĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĚĞďĂƚĞƐ ? ?/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ>ĂǁŝŶŽŶƚĞǆƚ
(2010) 6(2):1167-138 at 119 
15 Nordenfeld, op. cit. n12 at 78 
16 Rendtorff, op. cit. n11 at 237 
17 See infra, pp 8-9 
18 Mattson and Clark, op. cit. n1 
19 Riley, op. cit. n14 at 119 
20 Nordenfeld, op. cit. n12 at 72 
21 Marie-Jo Thiel ? ‘,ƵŵĂŶĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ PŝŶƚƌŝŶƐŝĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞǀĂůƵĞ ? ?International Journal of Bioethics (2010) 21(3) at 
61 
22 Mattson and Clark, op. cit. n1 
23 Nordenfeld, op. cit. n12 at 71-72 
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A third type of dignity which arises repeatedly in the literature is ³subjective dignity´. 
Mattson and Clark note that dignity can refer to ³a subjective and felt experience´,24 and 
1RUGHQIHOG¶VW\SRORJ\LQFOXGHVWKHVXEMHFWive ³dignity of identity´,25 the dignity we attach to 
ourselves. Rendtorff, too, acknowledges the use of dignity to refer to self-esteem, and the 
relatedness of the concept of dignity to subjective feelings like pride, shame, degradation and 
inferiority.26 
This is GLJQLW\¶V messy appeal: the idea of dignity attracts us by seeming to chime 
with some of our ethical intuitions, but as we attempt to analyse it, we come up against an 
array of possible meanings. The lack of a single, precise meaning persuades some scholars to 
deny that dignity has any distinct normative function at all,27 while others cite it tentatively, 
conscious that, without any satisfactory sense of a ³core meaning´ of dignity, there is no way 
of telling whether a particular use is apt or not. This latter problem is summed up by Mattson 
and Clark when they write that ³[l]ogically, people need some shared understanding of 
human dignity if the concept is to serve instrumentally and practically as common ground.´28  
This observation hints at another, non-typological approach to untangling the meaning 
of dignity. As I have argued elsewhere, what we need in relation to the concept of dignity is 
not a typology, but an ³organizing idea´,29 particularly given the bewildering variety of uses 
made of the word ³dignity´ in philosophical and legal discourse, only some of which are 
enumerated above. Elsewhere, I have attempted to show that the fact that dignity is used in a 
variety of different ways in ethical and legal discourses, and is used to mean a range of 
different things, does not signify that anything is ³amiss´ with the concept in general, as 
some commentators have claimed; rather, we should expect there to be a range of different 
meanings of ³dignity´ corresponding to the range of different legal language-games in which 
the term is used.30 Drawing on the distinction between concepts and conceptions (probably 
originated by Gallie in his seminal discussion of contested concepts,31 and developed by 
'ZRUNLQ5DZOV:DOGURQDQGRWKHUVDQGDOVRRQ:DOGURQ¶VXVHRI ³organizing ideas´ to 
describe the family resemblances shared by the various particular instantiations of general 
                                                          
24 Mattson and Clark, op. cit. n1 
25 Nordenfeld, op. cit. n12 at 74-77 
26 Rendtorff, op. cit. n11 at 237 
27 See supra n5 
28 Mattson and Clark, op. cit. n1 
29 M. EĞĂů ? ‘ŝŐŶŝƚǇ ?>ĂǁĂŶĚ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ-'ĂŵĞƐ ? ?International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, (2012) 
25(1):107-122 
30 Ibid, passim. 
31 t ? ?'ĂůůŝĞ ? ‘ƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ŽŶƚĞƐƚĞĚŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ? ? ? ?Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1956) 167 
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concepts (Waldron was referring specifically to private property), I have proposed a three-tier 
structure for understanding the use ± and therefore the meaning ± of ³dignity´.  
At the most local or particular level is the tier consisting of the various particular uses 
of the term ³dignity´: things that dignity is said to mean, or require, or prohibit, in particular 
circumstances and individual cases. This is the most contextual level, and would correspond 
to what Dworkin and others call ³conceptions´ ± realizations or instantiations of the concept. 
Tier two is more abstract, and consists of concepts rather than conceptions. In other writing 
which makes the concept/conception distinction, the level of concepts is the most abstract and 
acontextual; there is no greater level of abstraction.32 In the structure I propose, however, 
following Wittgenstein, concepts exist within the context of language-games, so that there is 
not one single concept of dignity, of which all uses are conceptions; rather, different concepts 
of dignity will exist too, which correspond to the different language-games within which they 
occur. Thus, healthcare law can have one concept of dignity; human rights law another; and 
so on. Insofar as the language-games themselves overlap, the concepts of dignity within them 
are likely also to overlap; the key point here, however, is that we should not insist on a single, 
unitary concept of dignity and problematize its absence. The existence of multiple concepts 
of dignity ought to be completely predictable and is appropriate given the variety of different 
language-games in which ³dignity´ is used. In tier three, finally, is what Waldron has termed 
an ³organizing idea´, in other words, a conceptual image or picture ± close to what 
Wittgenstein calls a ³family resemblance´ - which is capable of embracing all of the various 
concepts, conceptions, meanings, and uses of ³dignity´. 
Riley contends that ³GLJQLW\¶VFRPPRQDOLW\LQOHJDOGLVFRXUVHDQGLWVSRO\PRUSKRXV
QDWXUH«LVQRWZHOOVHUYHGE\WKHODQJXDJHRIµconcepts versus conceptions¶.´33 Disagreeing 
with McCrudden,34 he argues that ³[t]he identification of a core of commitments within the 
concept ± cashed-out into different, even competing, conceptions ± demands too much of its 
conceptual core´ and, ultimately, that such an analysis ³implies that conceptual stability and 
consensus could be won on the basis that parties and interlocutors can ultimately come to see 
the force of the values and judgments that are contested.´ 35  5LOH\¶V RZQ YLHZ LV WKDW 
³contestation concerning dignity will continue, that unlimited conceptions are likely to be 
                                                          
32 See, e.g. Christopher McCrudden ? ‘,ƵŵĂŶŝŐŶŝƚǇĂŶĚ:ƵĚŝĐŝĂů/ŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
European Journal of International Law, 19(4) 655-724 
33 Riley, op. cit. n14 at 135 
34 McCrudden, op. cit. n32 
35 Riley, op. cit. n14 at 135-136 
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generated, but also that these conceptions ± i.e. the uses made of dignity ± should take 
priority over the identification of a stable concept.´36 
I have likewise argued against identifying any one concept of dignity to be fleshed out 
in ³concrete conceptions´. Rather, my argument has been that there are many concepts of 
dignity, corresponding to the various language-games in which ³dignity´ features, which are 
related through an ³organizing idea´ (my suggestion here will be that idea of a moral 
response to vulnerability can fulfil this role).37 This avoids the need to overload a single 
conceptual core. If the aim here was to identify a stable, central concept of dignity, that 
would certainly be ³demanding too much´, as Riley puts it; aiming to identify an ³organizing 
idea´, however, need not be.  
This is the basic structure against which I will consider the relationship between 
dignity and vulnerability. When proposing the structure initially, I was concerned with the 
form, rather than the substance, of dignity, since so much discourse about dignity has seemed 
not to appreciate that different meanings of dignity in different contexts need not signify that 
the idea of dignity itself is essentially meaningless, or irredeemably vague. The priority, 
therefore, was to clarify this in order to remove what had become a familiar distraction. Now, 
however, I want to proceed to more substantive questions about the content, and meaning, of 
dignity, and in particular, to explore how the ³organizing idea´ of dignity is bound up with 
the phenomenon of human vulnerability. 
2. Problematizing autonomy-based accounts of dignity  
As noted above, a discernible Kantian influence is present in much contemporary discourse 
about dignity, and many writers who attempt to explain the source and nature of ³human 
dignity´ do so along largely Kantian lines, explicitly or at least perceptibly. (For ease of 
discussion I will refer here to accounts of dignity which define or justify dignity wholly or 
substantially in terms of ideas such as autonomy, rationality, self-determination, and/ or non-
instrumentalization, as ³broadly Kantian´.) Rütsche, for example, explains dignity as 
 
³the concept that each and every human being is, by virtue of its dignity, in itself 
valuable, regardless of its usefulness to anyone or for anything. The value of the 
human being lies in itself, not in his utility to achieve something. Human beings are 
not mere means to achieve ends but ends in themselves. This classical Kantian 
                                                          
36 Ibid. at 136 
37 Neal, op. cit. n29 
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approach expresses precisely what is meant by intrinsic value and, therefore, by 
human dignity.´ 38  This, according to Rütsche, is ³the concept of dignity that is 
generally recognised in Philosophy and Law.´39  
 
Equally explicit Kantian influences are evident elsewhere. Andorno writes, for example, that 
³[dignity] expresses the requirement not to instrumentalize human beings, by recalling that 
each person must be treated as an end in himself, and never simply as a PHDQV LQ.DQW¶V
famous phrase.´40 In seeking to explain the continuing influence of Kantian ideas in shaping 
GLVFRXUVHDERXWGLJQLW\.QRHSIIOHUDQG2¶0DOOH\ORRNWRUHFHQWworld history, and note that 
a Kantian model of dignity  
 
³necessarily precludes treating human beings instrumentally ± as merely means, as 
opposed to ends in themselves. This is a fundamental contrast to fascist systems, of 
course, to the socialist systems that existed in Eastern Europe, Asia and elsewhere, 
and to forms of utilitarian convictions that continue to inform political decisions 
today. Holding to a [Kantian] principle of human dignity precludes, therefore, the 
instrumentalization of human beings for economic, social, religious, or political 
ideals.´41  
 
$FFRUGLQJWR.QRHSIIOHUDQG2¶0DOOH\WKHQa reaction against totalitarianism, utilitarianism, 
and other ideologies within which the individual is ³instrumentalized´ may explain why 
dignity has come to be identified so closely with Kantian ethics and its ideals of non-
instrumentalization, autonomous subjecthood, individual self-determination and so on. 
Nevertheless, they recognize that developing an understanding of dignity based on too 
specific an experience of its violation can be counter-productive, and caution that focusing 
too intently on one experience, however horrific that experience was (they cite the example 
of Nazi atrocities, the recent memory of which was such a powerful impetus for the creation 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), might hamper our ability to recognize other 
                                                          
38 ĞƌŶŚĂƌĚZƺƚƐĐŚĞ ? ‘dŚĞ Role of Human Dignity in the Swiss Legal System: Arguing for a Dualistic Notion of 
,ƵŵĂŶŝŐŶŝƚǇ ?International Journal of Bioethics 2010 21(4) 83-92 at 87. 
39 Ibid. 
40 ZŽďĞƌƚŽŶĚŽƌŶŽ ? ‘ŝŐŶŝƚé humaine, dƌŽŝƚƐĚĞů ?homme et bioethique: quel rĂƉƉŽƌƚ ? ?International Journal 
of Bioethics 2010 21(4) 51-59 at 59 ( ‘[La dignité] exprime une exigence de non-ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĚĞů ?ġƚƌĞ
humain, en rappelant que chaque homme doit être traité comme une fin en soi et jamais simplement comme 
un moyen, pour employeƌůĂĐĠůğďƌĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŬĂŶƚŝĞŶŶĞ ? ?) 
41 <ŶŽĞƉĨĨůĞƌĂŶĚK ?DĂůůĞǇ ?op. cit. n4 at 66-67. 
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cases of dignity-violation which do not fit the chosen template$V.QRHSIIOHUDQG2¶0DOOH\
put it, an over-emphasis on the kind of dignity-violation perpetrated by the Nazis might 
³[screen] us from the dangers to human dignity that fall beyond the scope of what the Nazis 
did.´42 Similarly, we ought to be wary that any account that ties the idea of dignity too 
closely to individual self-determination and the capacities for autonomy or rationality runs 
the twin risks of obscuring types of dignity-violation which do not involve restrictions of 
individual freedom, or offences DJDLQVWKXPDQEHLQJV¶DXWRQRP\RUWKHLUUDWLRQDOLW\DQGRI
being unable to frame and justify adequate responses to the latter.  
It may be easy to see why the idea of dignity has received a Kantian spin; there is 
nothing inevitable about the tendency to understand dignity as a ³liberal´ value, however. 
Indeed, there are good reasons to resist it. Feldman points to one when he warns against the 
assumption ³that the idea of dignity is inextricable linked to a liberal-individualist view of 
human beings as people whose life-choices deserve respect´ on the grounds that on this 
understanding, dignity as a legal value could become a ³two-edged sword´ in that it may 
invite judgments about which life-choices are not compatible with dignity, leading to state 
restriction of such choices.43 
 There are two other, related problems for broadly Kantian accounts of dignity. One is 
the body of work across a range of disciplines (but particularly, for present purposes, in 
ethical and legal literatures) devoted to critiquing and deconstructing the ³liberal subject´. 
The ideal of a stable, bounded, self-sovereign subject distinguished by his capacity for 
autonomy and rationality (³his´ because the paradigm of the bounded, sovereign subject is 
the adult male with full capacity44) has been problematized repeatedly by critical theorists. 
The conceptualization of the human subject as an essentially abstract being consisting 
primarily in mental /intellectual capacities EHJLQV LQ HDUQHVW ZLWK 'HVFDUWHV¶ YLHZ RI WKH
essence of the self as a ³thinking thing´ that is ³distinct from [the] body, and can exist 
without it´,45 and /RFNH¶V  understanding of self as thinking mind and physical body,46 but 
with mind (or soul) the clear site of personal identity (encapsulated in his famous description 
of the person as a ³thinking, intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider 
                                                          
42 Ibid. at 74 
43 ĂǀŝĚ&ĞůĚŵĂŶ ? ‘,ƵŵĂŶŝŐŶŝƚǇĂƐĂ>ĞŐĂůsĂůƵĞWĂƌƚ/ ? ? ? ? ? ? Public Law, 682-702 at 685 
44 See, e.g., Ngaire Naffine ? ‘KƵƌ>ĞŐĂů>ŝǀĞƐĂƐDĞŶ ?tŽŵĞŶĂŶĚWĞƌƐŽŶƐ ?Legal Studies (2004) 24:621-642 
45 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and Replies, ed. John 
Cottingham (Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 54 
46 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A.D. Woozley (Cleveland Ohio, 1964). Grear 
ŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞďŽĚǇĚŽĞƐƉůĂǇĂƌŽůĞ ?ĞǀĞŶŝŶƐƵĐŚĂŶĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝƚƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚƵĂůŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ ?Ƶƚ
ƚŚĞƐĞďŽĚŝůǇƉĞƌĐĞƉƚƵĂůŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐŵĞƌĞůǇƐĞƌǀĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ? ?ŶŶĂ'ƌĞĂƌ ?Redirecting Human Rights: Facing 
the Challenge of Corporate Legal Humanity (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 115) 
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itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places´47). Later, in placing a 
subject characterized by autonomous will and practical reason at the centre of his ethical 
theory, Kant made the autonomous subject the seat of moral responsibility and the proper 
object of moral regard. This image of man as moral self-governor chimed with emerging 
Enlightenment notions of individual freedom, egalitarianism and the Rights of Man, and, 
slightly later on, with positivist, scientific approaches to the natural world and to law, so that 
it flourished through the nineteenth century and persists in more recent liberal thought.48  
Abstract, intellectual conceptions of subjecthood have been challenged, first, on the 
basis that they are descriptively flawed. For one thing, it is claimed that they presuppose a 
false dualism between mind and body, and tend to ignore or play down the fundamental and 
inescapable nature of humans as corporeal, organic beings. They have also been criticized by 
those who argue that often, our proper moral responses are provoked not by cognitive 
faculties (such as reason), but by our affective attachments and emotional reactions to 
circumstances.49 In addition, autonomy-based conceptions of subjecthood can be problematic 
in the normative sense, if they posit the capacities for autonomy, rationality and self-direction 
DVWKHVLWHQRWRQO\RIKXPDQEHLQJV¶PRUDODJHQF\EXWWKHLUPRUDOZRUWKVWDWXV7KHUHLVRI
course, a significant difference between observing that my abilities to reason and to act 
autonomously are critical to my moral agency, and making the more controversial claim that 
unless I possess the capacities for reason and autonomous action (unless I am a moral agent, 
in other words), I cannot matter morally, or cannot matter morally as much as someone else 
who does possess these capacities. This is broadly the kind of claim embodied in the ethical 
philosophies of contemporary personhood theorists, who deny full moral subjecthood and full 
moral status to beings who do not meet the criteria for ³full personhood´ (which almost 
invariably consist of psychological properties and intellectual capacities).50  
 This latter point, taken together with the prevalence of the tendency to use ³human 
dignity´ to mean ³intrinsic worth´, raises a dilemma. If we adopt an account of dignity in 
which, following Kant, dignity equals intrinsic worth (³no price´), and if we source that 
                                                          
47 Locke, op. cit. n46 at 211 
48 See, e.g., John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (revised edition) (Harvard (Belknap), 1999) 
49 See, e.g. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 1985) 
50 For suggestions regarding the cognitive capacities relevant to personhood, see e.g., Daniel C. Dennett, 
ƌĂŝŶƐƚŽƌŵƐ PWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůƐƐĂǇƐŽŶDŝŶĚĂŶĚWƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ ?WĞŶŐƵŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶWĞƌƌŝŶŐ ? ‘ĞŐƌĞĞƐŽĨ
PersŽŶŚŽŽĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨDĞĚŝĐŝŶĞĂŶĚWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ? ? W ? ?Ăƚ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ>ĂƵƌĞŶĐĞ>ŽĐŬĞ ? ‘WĞƌƐŽŶŚŽŽĚ
ĂŶĚDŽƌĂůZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>ĂǁĂŶĚWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ? W66 at 41. For examples of ethical theories that 
ĂƐĐƌŝďĞĨƵůůŵŽƌĂůƐƚĂƚƵƐ ? ‘ƉĞƌƐŽŶŚŽŽĚ ? ?ŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐis of the possession of cognitive capcities, see e.g. Peter 
Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge, 1993) (  ‘ƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ?ĂƐďĞŝŶŐƐǁŚŽƉŽƐƐĞƐƐƚŚĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚo hold preferences) 
and John Harris, The Value of Life  ?ZŽƵƚůĞĚŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ?ĂƐďĞŝŶŐƐĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨvaluing their own lives). 
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intrinsic worth in broadly Kantian notions of autonomy and rational self-determination, then 
we find ourselves drawn inexorably toward the conclusion that, far from being able to 
understand dignity as ³an intrinsic element of being human´51 or as signifying the ³intrinsic 
value of each human life´,52 the kind of intrinsic worth denoted by ³human dignity´ must be 
confined only to those who possess the relevant capacities or properties. Such a conclusion, 
however, would threaten to undermine one of the key functions of dignity in contemporary 
legal and ethical discourse: its role as the animating value behind human rights systems. If the 
value expressed by dignity is not universal, how can dignity ground universal rights?  
In practice, unlike personhood theorists, those writers who use ³dignity´ to refer to 
the intrinsic worth of human beings do tend also to emphasize the universality of dignity, and 
to claim that all human beings are equal in dignity (which is sometimes also described as 
inalienable).53 When they combine these claims with a broadly Kantian account of the source 
of dignity and its justification, and thus with references to non-instrumentalization, 
autonomous wills, and self-determination, however, an uncomfortable contradiction is 
produced: if human dignity does indeed have its source in these values, then given that 
autonomy, rationality, and the capacity to self-determine are not universally present in all 
human beings, and given that those human beings who do possess these capacities do not 
possess them equally, why should (indeed, how can) we regard human beings as being equal 
in dignity, or regard dignity as being universal?54  
A related, but separate problem for broadly Kantian accounts of dignity is that, if they 
align dignity too strongly with values like autonomy, rationality, or the ability to self-govern, 
they risk conflating dignity with these already-existing values, making it difficult to argue 
that there is anything distinctive about dignity, any unique normative space where dignity can 
do work not already done by other values. If dignity becomes a synonym for other values in 
this way, then it is no more than a ³rallying cry´,55 an idea that has purely rhetorical force, so 
                                                          
51 Haugen, 204 
52 Brenda Hale,  ‘ŝŐŶŝƚǇ ? ?Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law (2009) 31:2, 101-108 at 105, citing Ronald 
Dworkin, Is democracy possible here?: principles for a new political debate (Princeton University Press, 2006) 
53 Nordenfelt describes Menschenwürde in this way. 
54 EŽƌĚĞŶĨĞůƚ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĚŝŐŶŝƚǇŽĨ ‘Menschenwürde ?, discussed briefly above, describes an attempt to 
posit a universal dignity, and to justify it by reference to non-universal properties: we are supposed to have 
this kind of dignity, Nordenfelt says,  ‘ũƵƐƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞĂƌĞŚƵŵĂŶƐ ?, ĂŶĚǁĞŚĂǀĞŝƚ ‘ƚŽƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĚĞŐƌĞĞ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ǁĞ
ĂƌĞĞƋƵĂůǁŝƚŚƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƚŽƚŚŝƐŬŝŶĚŽĨĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ ? ?Nevertheless, Nordenfelt observes that  ‘ƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶŵŽĚĞƌŶ
ĂŶƐǁĞƌ ?ƚŽƚŚĞ question of the source of Menschenwürde is to ground it ŝŶ ‘ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐĐƌƵĐŝĂůƚŽŚƵŵĂŶƐ ?ƐƵĐŚ
as self-ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?ƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƌĞĂƐŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĨƌĞĞĚŽŵƚŽĚĞĐŝĚĞŽŶŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶǁĂǇŽĨůŝĨĞ ? 
55 Mattson and Clark, op. cit. n1 
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that critics such as Macklin56 and Pinker57 are correct when they argue that the idea of dignity 
expresses nothing which cannot be expressed ± more clearly ± by other principles.  
My contention here is that dignity can do distinctive normative work, and that we 
must move away from describing and justifying it in Kantian terms, and toward an account 
based upon the interconnectedness between dignity and vulnerability, in order to reveal the 
nature of the distinctive normative contribution that dignity can make. Such a shift would 
obviously neutralize those criticisms of dignity which attack its lack of distinctiveness, and 
specifically, its reducibility to the concepts of autonomy, personhood, and so on. It should be 
noted here, however, that the problem of conflation is not a danger only for Kantian 
approaches to dignity; clearly, any model, Kantian or otherwise, that seeks to establish 
dignity as a distinctive value must avoid describing or justifying dignity in such a way that 
dignity becomes indistinguishable from or interchangeable with other values or ideas. As 
alternative approaches to dignity are developed and defended, they will need to avoid 
conflating dignity, probably not with autonomy or rationality (since alternative approaches 
will, in order to be alternative, presumably focus their attention away from these), but with 
whatever values these emerging approaches prioritize besides dignity itself; this is a risk that 
the present analysis, as much as any other, must avoid.  
3. Vulnerability 
I have said that I will seek to understand dignity better by considering its relationship with the 
idea of vulnerability, and in order to begin this process, it is necessary first to clarify what I 
mean by ³vulnerability´. Vulnerability can refer either to a ³universal expression of the 
human condition´,58 or to the condition of particular ³vulnerable populations´. ³Vulnerable 
populations´ approaches have been criticized on several grounds. Luna cautions against 
oversimplification, arguing that ³[w]hen vulnerability is used as a fixed label on a particular 
subpopulation, it suggests a simplistic answer to a complex problem,´59 and Levine et al warn 
that ³the concept of vulnerability stereotypes whole categories of individuals without 
distinguishing between individuals in the group´.60  Brown notes criticisms of vulnerability 
                                                          
56 Macklin, op. cit. n5 
57 Pinker, op. cit. n5 
58 Rendtorff, op. cit. n11 at 237 
59 Florencia Luna,  ‘ůƵĐŝĚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ PůĂǇĞƌƐŶŽƚůĂďĞůƐ ? ?International Journal of Feminist 
Approaches to Bioethics (2009) 2(1) 121-139 at 124. 
60 Carol Levine, Ruth R. Faden, Christine Grady, Dale Hammerschmidt, Lisa Eckenwiler and Jeremy Sugarman, 
 ‘dŚĞůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ “ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ĂƐĂƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŚƵŵĂŶƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?American Journal of 
Bioethics 4(3): 44-49 at 47 
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as ³paternalistic and oppressive´, as a ³mechanism of widening social control´, as 
³patronising´ and as having a ³stigmatising or exclusive effect´.61   Finally, Luna notes the 
concern of some commentators that ³a growing overpopulation of µnew vulnerable groups¶´ 
might lead to the situation where everyone, or nearly everyone, falls into a vulnerable group, 
so that the concept of vulnerability itself becomes ³too nebulous to be meaningful´.62  
These criticisms all relate to uses of vulnerability that label identifiable groups within 
society as ³vulnerable´ (the sense in which someone might speak of ³the vulnerable´ as 
opposed to the rest of us). In some legal and ethical contexts, it probably is necessary to focus 
specifically on the particular, or heightened, vulnerability of identifiable populations or 
groups.63 The vulnerability I am concerned with here, however, is universal vulnerability, and 
the sense in which, as Martha Fineman has observed, vulnerability is the norm, rather than 
the exception, in human experience. 64  The concern that ³if everyone is vulnerable, 
vulnerability cannot be meaningful´ may be a reasonable one in the context of a population-
based approach and a ³vulnerability-reducing agenda´;65 indeed, such a context may even 
provide incentives for individuals to perceive and represent themselves as vulnerable in order 
to qualify for and benefit from enhanced protections or allowances, which in turn could result 
in a ³competitive vulnerability´ wherein different groups and their advocates strive to secure 
the best ³deals´. In that context, it may even become difficult to ascertain when 
³vulnerability´ begins to become a form of social capital ± a source of power, or advantage. 
In that context, accordingly, fear about the concept losing its meaning through over-extension 
might be well-founded. The sense of vulnerability I wish to focus on, however, does not 
become less meaningful by virtue of its extensive ± indeed, its universal ± reach; on the 
contrary, I hope to show that its universality is precisely what makes it capable of grounding 
moral obligations, and specifically, those relating to the value of human dignity. 
 What, then, is meant by vulnerability in the ³universal sense´? In its negative aspect, 
vulnerability speaks to our universal capacity for suffering, in two ways. First, I am 
vulnerable because I depend upon the co-operation of others (including, importantly, the 
State) for the pursuit and achievement of various ends, including those ends which relate to 
                                                          
61 K. ƌŽǁŶ ? ‘ ?sƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? P,ĂŶĚůĞǁŝƚŚĂƌĞ ? ?Ethics and Social Welfare, (2011) 5:3, 313-321 at 316 
62 Luna, op. cit. n60, 127-128, quoting Levine et al, op. cit. n61 at 45. 
63 See, e.g. the essays collected in Mégret, F., Hoffmann, F., et al, Dignity: A Special Focus on Vulnerable Groups 
(Research Paper for the Swiss Initiative to Commemorate the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights), June 2009  
64See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman ? ‘dŚĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ PŶĐŚŽƌŝŶŐĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶ
Martha Albertson Fineman (ed.), Transcending the boundaries of law: generations of feminism and legal theory 
(Glasshouse, 2011), 161-175 
65 Rendtorff, op. cit. n11 at 237 
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the satisfaction of important needs. Second, I am vulnerable because I am penetrable; I am 
permanently open and exposed to hurts and harms of various kinds. These two sources of 
vulnerability ± reliance on others for co-operation, and openness to positive harm ± are 
simply two means by which I might come to experience suffering; thus, it is suffering, and 
the capacity for suffering, that is definitive of this negative aspect of vulnerability. The extent 
and intensity of my vulnerability at a particular moment, or with regard to a particular need or 
harm, may be affected by my age, my sex, my degree of capacity, my health, my social 
status, my wealth, and a variety of other factors. Nevertheless, even the least vulnerable 
human being is still fundamentally, and inescapably, vulnerable in the negative sense, since 
none of us can meet her basic needs and satisfy her core desires without the co-operation of 
others; and even the most capable adult is vulnerable to hurt and harm, both physical and 
emotional. 
However, as Grear notes, ³vulnerability can be taken further than this, and 
conceptualised as both a source and expression of radical interrelationaility.´66 Travelling 
EH\RQG YXOQHUDELOLW\¶V QHJDWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQV ³we can conceive of vulnerability as a 
quintessential embodied openness to each other and to the world´67. Crucially, she writes, 
vulnerability is ³a key incident of human embodiment´,68 and the openness of our bodies 
exists not only in the negative sense of dependence and penetrability ± sources of pain and 
suffering ± but also in a positive ³affectability´, an openness to all that is welcome and 
embraceable and dynamic about our interconnectedness with, and our ability to interface 
ZLWKRWKHUEHLQJVDQGRXUZLGHUHQYLURQPHQW,Q*UHDU¶VZRUGV 
 
³The openness ± the ethesiological nature ± of the living body, once fully appreciated, 
might provide the foundation for a vulnerability thesis that allows us to embrace 
vulnerability as a dynamic interrelational concept highly suggestive of richer human 
bonds not only with human beings, but of humans with the world itself.´69  
 
This leads her to conclude that ³While it is certain that vulnerability is the root of our 
FDSDFLW\ IRU VXIIHULQJ«YXOQHUDELOLW\ LV DOVR WKe source of multiple forms of wellbeing and 
                                                          
66 Anna Grear, Redirecting Human Rights: Facing the Challenge of Corporate Legal Humanity (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010) 132 
67 Ibid. at 133 
68 Ibid. at 126 
69 Ibid. at 132 
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joy, and the basis of empathy and intimacy´.70  The claim I will be making later ± that 
vulnerability is fundamental to human dignity, and is positively valued whenever we value 
dignity ± will apply to both the negative and the positive senses of vulnerability.  
 
4. The place of vulnerability in ethics 
 
The idea that vulnerability is fundamental to ethics is not new, of course. In an important 
sense, vulnerability to harm and suffering is the starting point of every mainstream ethical 
theory. Such theories all seem to proceed upon some version of the idea that moral agents are 
required, ethically, to respond to the vulnerability of their fellow human beings (and often 
also to that of non-humans) by positively protecting / assisting them, and/or by refraining 
from exploiting them or otherwise causing them harm. We see a concern with harm/suffering, 
and therefore with vulnerability, in many of the duties prescribed by deontological ethics; in 
the concern to maximize happiness in classical utilitarianism, and in 0LOO¶VKDUPSULQFLSOHin 
the relationality and interdependence presupposed by ethics of care and empathy; in the 
principles of beneficence and non-maleficence in applied ethics; and so on.  
All of this simply notices, however, that many ethical theories are motivated by 
responding to vulnerability. Is an ethical theory possible, though, in which responding to 
vulnerability is not a concern?   Some writers have claimed, or implied, a necessary 
connection between vulnerability and ethics. Solbakk, for example, regards ³respect for 
vulnerability´ as ³the foundation of all ethics.´71 Shildrick, writes that ³it is vulnerability 
itself, of the one and of the other, and the responsibility that it engenders in the one and for 
the other, that is the provocation of ethical subjectivity.´72 It is vulnerability, in other words ± 
our own, and that of others ± that ³provokes´ us to become ethical beings, capable of ethical 
responses. The clear inference here is that in the absence of vulnerability, there would (could) 
be no ethics. 
Martha Nussbaum, reflecting on an argument by Claudia Card about what Stoicism 
reveals of the relationship between vulnerability and morality, summarizes: ³[imagine] a 
Stoic life in which one succeeds in rendering oneself invulnerable to the blows of fortune, 
                                                          
70 Ibid. at 129 
71 :ĂŶ,ĞůŐĞ^ŽůďĂŬŬ ? ‘sƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ P&ƵƚŝůĞŽƌhƐĞĨƵůWƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŝŶ,ĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞƚŚŝĐƐ ? ?ŝn Henk ten Have, Ruth 
Chadwick and Eric M. Meslin (eds), Sage Handbook of Health Care Ethics (SAGE, 2011) at 230 (emphasis in 
original). 
72 Margrit Shildrick, Embodying the Monster: Encounters with the Vulnerable Self  (SAGE, 2002) at 102 
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VHFXUH LQ WKHGLJQLW\RIRQH¶V LQDOLHQDEOH UDWLRQDOQDWXUH:HVRRQGLVFRYHU >&DUG@DUJXHV
that such lives lack dimensions that we usually put at the heart of a picture of morality.´73 
&DUG¶Vargument, which Nussbaum approves, appears to be that beings who have minimized 
their vulnerability to the vicissitudes of fortune to the extent that the Stoics have live 
diminished moral lives because of this. Nussbaum asks: ³Will Stoics even refrain from 
cruelty themselves, once they understand that what they do is no burden to the virtuous [i.e. 
those who have similarly minimized their attachments, and accordingly their 
vulnerability]?´74  All of this seems to treat the shared experience of vulnerability as an 
essential prerequisite for interpersonal ethics. Nussbaum makes this even more explicit when 
she says that ³moral excellence is about taking risks to protect human vulnerability: if 
vulnerability is denied, then the traditional virtues lose their point.´75 Rendtorff and Kemp 
also treat vulnerability as a precondition of ethics when they write that vulnerability 
³H[SUHVVHVWKHILQLWXGHDQGIUDJLOLW\RIOLIHZKLFK«JURXQGVWKHSRVVLELOLW\DQGQHFHVVLW\IRU
all morality.´76 Perhaps the most efficient summation, however, is that of Brownsword, who 
remarks that ³one condition of moral community is that members are vulnerable, that they 
have interests that are capable of being harmed.´77 
 There is clear support, then, for the idea of a fundamental connection between 
vulnerability and ethics per se, and thus for the view that all ethical values and principles can 
be characterized as responses to vulnerability. The importance of this for the present 
argument is that it will not be enough, if dignity is to be distinguished from other ethical 
values, to claim simply that dignity is a response to vulnerability. As has been seen, there are 
those who would claim that this is true of all ethical principles. It is not essential to my 
argument that this claim be vindicated or refuted. Certainly, if the idea of a necessary 
connection between vulnerability and ethics could successfully be undermined, it would 
mean that simply establishing a connection between dignity and vulnerability might suffice to 
render dignity distinctive, so that my job in this paper may be easier. As it is, given the 
possibility that all of ethics is about responding to vulnerability, it becomes necessary to 
                                                          
73 Martha C. NussbaƵŵ ? ‘WŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŶŝŵĂůƐ P>ƵĐŬ ?>ŽǀĞ ?ĂŶĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Metaphilosophy 29 (4) 273-287, at  
275 
74 Ibid. at 275 
75 Ibid. 
76 Rendtorff, J.D. and Kemp, P. Basic Ethical Principles in European Bioethics and Biolaw Vol I: Autonomy, 
Dignity, Integrity and Vulnerability (Institut Borja de Bioètica, 2000) at 398 
77 ZŽŐĞƌƌŽǁŶƐǁŽƌĚ ? ‘,ƵŵĂŶŝŐŶŝƚǇ ?ŝŽůĂǁ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƐŝƐŽĨDŽƌĂůŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?International Journal of 
Bioethics 2010 21(4) 21-40 at 31 
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defend the distinctiveness of dignity by claiming for it a unique type of connection with 
vulnerability. 
5. Vulnerability and dignity I: George Harris and ³benign breakdown´ 
Notwithstanding what has just been said about the possibility that vulnerability is at the heart 
of all ethics, nevertheless the relationship between dignity and vulnerability has only begun to 
be theorized in the academic literature relatively recently. In researching this paper I could 
find only one monograph whose central concern was the relationship between dignity and 
vulnerability. 78  %H\OHYHOG DQG %URZQVZRUG¶V Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 79 
contains an illuminating discussion of the relationship, but although it is a key part of the 
DXWKRUV¶ DUJXPHQW LW GRHV QRW DFFRXQW IRU D ODUJH SRUWLRQ RI WKHLU GLVFXVVLRQ :LWK WKH
distinguished exception of Beyleveld and Brownsword, the emerging approach in bioethics 
(bioethical literature being by far the richest seam of commentary treating dignity and 
YXOQHUDELOLW\ WRJHWKHU VHHPV WR EH D WHQGHQF\ WR WUHDW µYXOQHUDELOLW\¶ RU µUHVSHFW IRU
YXOQHUDELOLW\¶DVDSULQFLSOHLQLWVRZQULJKWDORQJVLGHWKHµVHSDUDWH¶SULQFLSOHRIµUHVSHFWIRU
KXPDQ GLJQLW\¶ 7KLV is the approach taken by the Northern European movement which 
attempts to re-GUDZWKHµIRXUSULQFLSOHV¶DSSURDFKWRELRHWKLFVWRLQFOXGHµYXOQHUDELOLW\¶DQG
µGLJQLW\¶DVNH\HWKLFDOSULQFLSOHV80 Thus, the role of vulnerability as internal to the idea of 
dignity remains largely unexplored, the two above exceptions apart. 
 The most extended philosophical treatment of the connection between the ideas of 
vulnerability and dignity is that undertaken by Harris. 81  His central argument closely 
resembles that of Card & Nussbaum, and Harris uses same example of the Stoics ± whose 
influence he sees plainly in Christian and Kantian approaches to dignity ± to demonstrate the 
crucial role of vulnerability in what it is that we are seeking to value when we invoke dignity. 
The chief difference is that, where Card and Nussbaum are concerned with the connection 
between vulnerability and the moral life generally, Harris claims to be concerned with how 
vulnerability is fundamental to, and part of what we value about, dignity in particular.   
7KH µQHJDWLYH¶ DLP RI +DUULV¶V SURMHFW LV WR ³break the Kantian monopoly on the 
concept of dignity by demonstrating that dignity is not what Kantians would have us 
                                                          
78 George Harris, Dignity and Vulnerability: Strength and Quality of Character (University of California Press: 
Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1997) 
79 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP: Oxford, 2001) 
80 See, e.g. Rendtorff, op. cit. n11 
81 Harris, op. cit. n79 
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believe.´82 For Harris, ³reaVRQ«LV QRW WKH VROH EHDUHU RI RXU GLJQLW\ DV .DQW ZRXOG KDYH
it´83, since ³our dignity-conferring qualities ± qualities that are the objects of our sense of 
respect ± are not confined to our rational capacities.´84 Instead, he argues, ³our concept of 
human dignity involves the notion of vulnerability in ways for which the Kantians cannot 
allow.´ 85  The Kantians and Stoics, according to Harris, envisage dignity in terms of 
invulnerability, and ³deny any connection between vulnerability and good character.´86 As 
Badhwar has put it: 
 
³Kant makes us God-like in our invulnerability, but, Harris argues, there is nothing 
either admirable or dignified about God´s invulnerability; dignity and agency imply 
the ability to face difficult circumstances. In particular, dignity implies an agent who 
attempts to live a good life and is willing to face difficulties that threaten his 
categorical commitments, commitments that define his character and integrity.´87 
 
$FHQWUDOSODQNRI+DUULV¶V WKHVLV WKHQ LV WKDW WKHUH LV ³a kind of fragility that is good and 
admirable´.88 There are some kinds of fragility ± physical and psychological/moral ± that we 
seek, quite rightly, to avoid. Harris acknowledges that a lack of courage, for example, may be 
evidence either of a vice, or of the absence of virtue (unfortunately he offers no example 
here), and Card (borrowing from Nussbaum) illustrates how it often makes sense for us to 
render ourselves less vulnerable: immunization against communicable disease, installation of 
smoke alarms, and checking car brakes are the examples she provides. Ultimately for Harris, 
however, vulnerability in general is an ethically-important phenomenon not just because it 
make us weak and needy, attracting the ethical obligations of others, their aid and care; but 
because, in an important sense, vulnerability makes us good, or at the very least, it raises the 
possibility of the good and the admirable. 89  According to Harris, ³whatever a perfectly 
admirable human character would involve, it would not involve unlimited integral 
                                                          
82 Anthony Cunningham,  ‘Review of Dignity and Vulnerability: Strength and Quality of Character by George W. 
Harris ?, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2000) 61(1): 239-241 at 240 
83 Harris, op. cit. n79 at 70 
84 Ibid. at 68 
85 Ibid. at 35, emphasis added. 
86 Cunningham, op. cit. n83 at 240. 
87 Neera K. Badhwar,  ‘Review of Dignity and Vulnerability: Strength and Quality of Character by George W. 
Harris ?, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2001) 63(1): 246-248 at 248 
88 Harris, op. cit. n79 at 3 
89 Ĩ ?'ƌĞĂƌ ?Ɛ discussion of vulnerability as a positive openness, supra pp 11-12. 
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strength´; 90  on the contrary, ³we admire people and afford them dignity for their 
vulnerability.´ 91  Using the example of grief, he continues: ³Vulnerability to grief is a 
function of having loving qualities, and we admire people for being so vulnerable. The 
Kantian view is that we admire people for coping with the vulnerability well, not for the 
vulnerability itself. But connectedness in the form of personal ORYH«LVGLJQLW\FRQIHUULQJLQ
its own right.´92 
So far, so good, perhaps - EXW+DUULV¶VDQDO\VLVEHFRPHVGLIILFXOWLQVRIDUDVLWUHOLHVRQWKH
concept of what he calls ³benign breakdown´. Benign breakdown, which Harris contrasts 
with non-benign types of breakdown, occurs when ³a person breaks down because he or she 
possesses admirable character, not for the lack of it.´93 Harris defines breakdown as an event 
that renders the person ³dysfunctional as an agent´ and might manifest as ³a loss in the will 
to live, deep clinical depression, insanity, hysteria, debilitating shame [or] pervasive self-
deception´. 94  His point about benign breakdown consists of two claims: (i) ³there are 
DGPLUDEOHFKDUDFWHUWUDLWVWKDWFDQEHWKHVRXUFHRIDSHUVRQ¶VVHOI-destruction´,95 and (ii) ³the 
prevention of such self-destruction by the removal of the character trait would be a greater 
GDPDJHWRWKHSHUVRQ¶VFKDUDFWHUWKDQWKHVHOI-destruction.´96  
 Harris may be correct when he says that dignity is not what Kantian accounts would 
have us believe, and he begins to get at something of vital importance when he hints that 
dignity can be understood, instead, as being concerned with a positive valuing of 
vulnerability. When he seems to claim that it is better, in terms of dignity, to suffer a 
complete breakdown than to lose an admirable characteristic, however, it feels like a claim 
too far. Even among ethicists who are happy to re-imagine dignity away from Kantian 
influence, and who may wish to maintain that dignity can persist even in the midst of extreme 
suffering, there must be few who could regard ³insanity, hysteria, debilitating shame, [and] 
pervasive self-deception´ as being, in any sense, evidence of dignity. Moreover, once a 
³benign breakdown´ has occurred its effects are surely unpredictable, meaning that it is 
impossible to say what the possible impact on the future dignity of the person will be. Harris 
tells us that ³we need not imagine the breakdown as permanent, but it must be severe and 
                                                          
90 Harris, op. cit. n79. at 7 
91 Ibid. at 67, emphasis added. 
92 Ibid. at 70 
93 Ibid. at 4 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. at 3 
96 Ibid. at 4 
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somewhat protracted´.97 Thus, breakdown involves a person becoming severely incapacitated 
and remaining so for (at the very least) some considerable time. In light of this, even if we 
accept that the breakdown is in itself evidence that the person affected by it had dignity in 
one sense, the same event, at the same time, must surely have significantly reduced or 
removed dignity in all of senses not associated with the particular character trait which made 
the person in question so vulnerable. Dignity of conduct, for instance, may well be reduced or 
ORVW HYHQ WKRVHZKRRIXVZKRZRXOGQRWGHQ\GLJQLW\ LQ WKHVHQVHRI µLQWULQVLFZRUWK¶ WR
those who are insane or hysterical would be less inclined to regard the behaviour of the 
LQVDQH SHUVRQ RU WKH K\VWHULF DV µGLJQLILHG¶ +DUULV himself seems to WUHDW µGLJQLW\¶ DV
referring mainly to a virtue, or excellence of character.98 Following breakdown, however, and 
its thorough disruption of the integrity of the character of the individual, her ability to pursue 
and develop a dignified character is also likely to suffer, so that any sense of dignity-as-
YLUWXHWKH µGLJQLW\ RI FKDUDFWHU¶ WRR LV OLNHO\ WR EH VHULRXVO\ XQGHUPLQHG following 
breakdown.  
+DUULV¶V LQVLVWHQFH WKDW ³our vulnerability to integral breakdown is essential to what 
gives us our dignity´ must count as a significant problem with his thesis, not only because of 
the likelihood that such breakdown must do more damage than good to dignity, but also 
because he never really explains clearly how the connection between dignity and benign 
breakdown is supposed to work. What is more, Harris never defines what he means by 
µGLJQLW\¶ DQG VLQFH GLJQLW\ KDV VR PDQ\ SRVVLEOH XVHV WKLV ODFk of clarity undermines the 
whole thesis: unless we know to what Harris is referring when he mentions µGLJQLW\¶KRZ
can we understand or evaluate the supposed connection between dignity and vulnerability, or 
dignity and ³benign breakdown´? In fact, as noted already, Harris seems to treat dignity as a 
YLUWXH D SDUWLFXODU W\SH RI H[FHOOHQFH RI FKDUDFWHU EXW KH DOVR VHHPV WR PHDQ µLQWULQVLF
ZRUWK¶ DV HYLGHQW IRU H[DPSOH LQ VWDWHPHQWV VXFK DV ³we have a fairly vague concept of 
human worth and dignity´,99 and references to ³the dignity and worth of persons´.100  In 
failing to be clear in this regard, in failing to show how it is that vulnerability is crucial to 
dignity (understood either as excellent/virtuous character or as intrinsic worth), and in relying 
upon the extreme circumstance of integral breakdown as his key evidence of the supposed 
relationship between the two, then, Harris ultimately fails to establish how dignity and 
vulnerability are connected. Nevertheless, I think glimpses of a more promising account can 
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98 Although he stops short of definiŶŐƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇǁŚĂƚŚĞŵĞĂŶƐďǇ ‘ĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ ? (see below). 




be discerned in +DUULV¶VWKHVLVZKLFKWDNHQDORQJVLGHRWKHUVLPLODULQVLJKWVPLJKWHQDEOHXV
to begin to sketch the connection in another way.    
6. Vulnerability and dignity II: a balancing act 
At the beginning of his inquiry, Harris alludes briefly to what he calls ³an alternative 
strategy´, which is  
 
³to argue that there are admirable character traits that can be the source of making 
persons less strong than they could be and that the prevention of this kind of weakness 
by the removal of such traits would be a greater damage to their character than the 
vulnerability itself.´101  
 
In other words, to argue, without the problematic dependence on the concept of ³benign 
breakdown´, simply that some of the characteristics that make us ³admirable´ (and, on 
+DUULV¶VDFFRXQW ³dignified´) also make us vulnerable. Insofar as it does not make dignity 
depend on the idea of ³breakdown´, this alternative strategy seems preferable; however 
Harris does not pursue it, so that the remainder of his thesis does indeed seem to hinge on the 
dubious notion of breakdown as central to dignity. In the absence of any elaboration, it is 
impossible to judge how successful the ³alternative strategy´ might have been; certainly, as 
noted earlier, the general connection between vulnerability and morality has been explored 
extensively by other philosophers, notably Nussbaum, 102  however (i) these previous 
examinations have not attended specifically to the idea of dignity, and (ii) Nussbaum for one 
has made clear that her purpose is to acknowledge vulnerability as ³a necessary background 
condition of certain genuine human goods´, but not to ³endorse the romantic position that 
vulnerability and fragility are to be prized in their own right´103 ± meaning that an analysis 
which does seek positively to value these things could be distinctive. 
My contention now will be that the ³organizing idea´ which animates and unites the 
various meanings of dignity across the range of contexts in which that term is used is the idea 
of balance, and in particular, the idea of an equilibrium between the ³finite´ and 
³transcendent´ aspects of human existence. Further, I hope to show that, if the value of 
dignity is indeed all about valuing this kind of equilibrium, then it follows that dignity 
                                                          
101 Ibid. at 4 
102 See, e.g., Nussbaum, The fragility of goodness: luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy (Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), and Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire (Princeton University Press, 1994) 
103 Martha C. Nussbaum, The fragility of goodness, preface to the revised edition (2001), page xxx 
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positively values our fragility, our finitude ± our human vulnerability. Such a positive valuing 
of vulnerability would distinguish dignity from other ethical values and principles, which 
value entities, characters, and conduct in spite of or regardless of their vulnerability, rather 
than positively because of it. 
It has been described as the ³GLFKRWRP\ RI >PDQ¶V@ H[LVWHQFH´ that he is ³part of 
nature, subject to her physical laws and unable to change them, yet he transcends 
QDWXUH«´,104 a duality that Nussbaum describes when she observes that ³[h]uman beings are 
vulnerable animals, naked, needy, and weak. They are threatened both by an indifferent 
nature and by their own hostilities. They need food, drink, shelter, medicine, love, care, 
protection from violence. But they also aspire, speak, and create.´105  
Rendtorff connects this duality with the principle he calls ³respect for vulnerability´, 
saying that ³[r]espect for vulnerability must find the right balance between this logic of the 
struggle for immortality and the finitude of the earthly presence of human suffering.´106 He 
regards his principle (which is close to what I want to claim as the organizing idea of dignity) 
as the ³foundation of ethics in our time´ insofar as it expresses ³the destiny of finitude´.107 
He does not, however, go so far as to connect it to what he regards, after all, as the ³separate´ 
ethical principle of dignity; nevertheless, he clearly treats the idea of balancing the finite and 
transcendent aspects of humanity as being of fundamental ethical importance. 
It falls to Beyleveld and Brownsword finally to make the connection between this 
kind of balancing/equilibrium and the idea of dignity explicit. They express the aspects being 
balanced slightly differently (though the elements of the earthly and the sublime are still 
clearly present) when they write that ³to have a dignified character is to possess a personality 
in which fear of personal extinction and hope of immortality are in equilibrium, 
DQG«GLJQLILHGFRQGXFWLVFRQGXFWWKDWH[KLELWVsuch a personality.´108  
On the one hand, then, human beings are essentially corporeal, mortal, fragile and 
finite, confined and restricted by the laws of nature and by our own bounded embodiment. 
³We value ourselves´ as Harris remarks, ³as natural organisms, as animals, rather than as 
gods that transcend nature´.109 Yet, equally essentially, we are beings who strive for ± and 
achieve ± the sublime, the awe-inspiring, and the transcendent. We aspire to be, not just 
                                                          
104 Beyleveld and Brownsword, op. cit. n80 at 116, quoting Erich Fromm The Anatomy of Human 
Destructiveness (Jonathan Cape, 1974) at 225-6 
105 Nussbaum, op. cit. n74 at 274 
106 Rendtorff, op. cit. n11 at 237 
107 Ibid. 
108 Beyleveld and Brownsword, op. cit. n80 at 114 
109 Harris, op. cit. n79 at 2 
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animals, but moral beings: to pursue second-order preferences and desires; to hold ourselves 
and others to standards of behaviour that surpass those we tolerate from other animals and 
would settle for from ourselves if we were content to fulfil only the animal side of our nature; 
and we characteristically hope for immortality, either in the literal sense of ³life after death´, 
or in a secular sense through the legacies of our work (art, invention, discovery) and the 
personal marks we leave on those whose lives have intersected with our own (we wish not to 
be forgotten). ³Our dignity´, Harris says, ³is in the kind of animals we are´.110 
This is not to posit a dualism of antipathy in which the material/animal is base or 
ignoble in relation to the transcendent/immortal/sublime. This idea of equilibrium ± at least as 
I conceive of it in relation to dignity ± regards the finite and transcendent elements of our 
being, not as oppositional, but as inseparable, and as being of equal importance to our 
humanity (and thus our ³human dignity´). The point, as I see it, is not to minimize the finite 
and maximize the sublime; the important thing is to hold the two in an appropriate balance. 
We do not magnify our dignity by fetishizing the transcendent at the expense of the material, 
or vice versa%H\OHYHOGDQG%URZQVZRUG¶VLQVLJKWWKDWDGLJQLILHGFKDUDFWHUUHTXLUHV³fear of 
SHUVRQDO H[WLQFWLRQ DQG KRSH RI LPPRUWDOLW\«LQ HTXLOLEULXP´111 indicates that it would be 
just as inconsistent with dignity to have too little UHJDUGIRURQH¶VPRUWDOLW\and the material 
side of oneself ± say, to ignore immediate physical needs such as cleanliness or adequate 
nutrition, or deliberately to ULVNRQH¶VOLIHZLWKRXW MXVWLILFDWLRQ± as it would be willingly to 
allow oneself to become so utterly dominated by concern for these material needs that 
³transcendent´ pursuits such as work, friendship, love and art became impossible. 
On examination, the idea of ³balance´ turns out to be inherent in models of dignity as 
RSSRVLWHDV.DQW¶VDQG+DUULV¶VWKHGLIIHUHQFHLVLQWKHLr views regarding where the balance 
ought to be struck. According to Harris, 
 
³7KH .DQWLDQ YLHZ«LV WKDW SDWKRORJLFDO LQIOXHQFHV RQ RXU FKDUDFWHU >E\ ZKLFK KH
means influences that render us vulnerable, such as the emotions] must always be 
under the control RIUHDVRQ«IRUXVWRYLHZWKHPDVPRUDOO\WROHUDEOH´112  
 
Harris, as we have seen, would strike the balance differently, to accommodate those 
³admirable character traits that can be the source of a person¶s self-destruction´ and which he 
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regards as fundamental to dignity.113 But we can positively value vulnerability for its role in 
dignity-creation without going as far as Harris in linking dignity to the possibility of self-
destruction: simply by understanding human existence in terms of an existential balancing, or 
equilibrium, we can appreciate the centrality of vulnerability to what we value when we value 
dignity. Here, it is helpful to consider some of the main ³types´ or uses of dignity and how 
the idea of balancing might apply to them. 
First, take the use of dignity to signify the intrinsic worth of all human beings. How 
can the idea of balancing apply to this use? We might say that, since (as far as we know) 
humanity alone embodies the union of the finite and the transcendent, and the possibility of 
achieving balance between them, this dichotomy is apparently what distinguishes human 
from nonhuman existence and confers a unique kind of value / worth on human existence per 
se, independently of whether or not balance is actually achieved within any particular human 
life. The species as a whole, on this view, could attract the value of dignity because the finite 
and the transcendent coexist in humanity exclusively, and individual members of the species 
might be regarded as having intrinsic worth because their lives are lives in which the finite 
and the transcendent coincide, so that balance between them becomes a possibility.  
There are problems for this explanation, of course: if it is the equilibrium we value, 
why should we ascribe value to an entire species when the admirable equilibrium is 
achievable only on an individual, rather than a whole-species level; and why should we 
ascribe intrinsic value to those individual lives in which the relevant balance is not achieved? 
If it is the equilibrium we admire and value, why should we not limit ourselves to ascribing 
the value of ³dignity´ only to those individual lives which do achieve it? This is a problem 
only for those who insist on using dignity in this first sense, to signify universal, intrinsic 
worth of the kind necessary, for example, to ground universal human rights. Although dignity 
is widely used in this way, including in some of the main human rights documents, in human 
rights jurisprudence, and in academic commentary, it might be argued that dignity is not the 
best tool to use for this purpose. The ascription of intrinsic worth to all human beings might 
perhaps be justified better by appealing to another ethical principle, for example the principle 
of sanctity-of-life. Sanctity can be understood in secular terms, and can easily be interpreted 
as protecting not only life itself, but all of the things currently understood as protected by 
³human dignity´. So it may be that we do not need to rely on dignity as a foundation for 
                                                          




universal human rights at all.114 Nevertheless, it may be that the rhetoric of dignity is by now 
so far embedded in human rights discourse that, practically speaking, any ³organizing idea´ 
we settle on must now accommodate the use of dignity to mean the kind of universal, 
intrinsic worth on which human rights may be based. If so, then we can defend the idea of 
³dignity as balance´ by observing that, while it may be problematic in the ways just 
mentioned, it is no more so than existing Kantian models which seek to ground this 
³universal´ sense of dignity in non-universal characteristics such as rationality, autonomy, 
and the capacity to self-determine.115 
We have seen that the idea of dignity is also commonly invoked to describe types of 
praiseworthy conduct or behaviour. Here, the idea of balancing is clearly applicable: we 
conduct ourselves ³with dignity´ when we behave in a way that exemplifies an appropriate 
balance between our finitude/materiality and our transcendence/immortality. Take the 
example of a bereaved relative at a funeral, or in court during the trial of someone accused of 
KHUORYHGRQH¶VPXUGHUShe bears herself with restraint and self-control, and is moderate in 
her utterances. She may even express forgiveness, call on her community not to retaliate, or 
request mercy for the perpetrator. All of this impresses us because we assume her to be 
suffering great pain and distress, and to be conducting herself in this way despite the way she 
is feeling. In other words, her vulnerability is a necessary and integral part of what we value 
when we value her dignified conduct. If we knew her to have been unloving or indifferent to 
the deceased person, or to be a Stoic who had trained herself not to become attached / not to 
respond emotionally, her conduct would be less admirable (or perhaps not admirable at all).  
In yet another type of use discussed above, ³dignity´ indicates a virtue or excellence 
of character. Harris seems to use it in this way, as do Beyleveld and Brownsword. Recalling 
their remark that ³to have a dignified character is to possess a personality in which fear of 
SHUVRQDO H[WLQFWLRQ DQG KRSH RI LPPRUWDOLW\ DUH LQ HTXLOLEULXP DQG«GLJQLILHG FRQGXFW LV
conduct that exhibits such a personality´,116 the connection between this type of the use and 
the one discussed in the previous paragraph is clear. Dignity as an excellence of character, it 
seems, implies a long-standing commitment to dignified conduct, a personality disposed to 
                                                          
114 I hope to assess the respective merits of dignity and sanctity in describing universal intrinsic worth in future 
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such conduct &RQVLGHU 1XVVEDXP¶V GHVFULSWLRQ RI WKH FKDUDFWHU RI +HFXED LQ (XULSLGHV¶
Trojan Women: 
 
³Bent with age and suffering, she walks slowly toward the Greek ships. Given as a 
slave to Odysseus, the Greek whom she most despises, she has endured the sack of 
Troy, the murder of Priam her husband, the rape and madness of Cassandra her 
daughter, the brutal killing of Astyanax her grandchild, hope for the future of the city. 
)LQDOO\ VKHKDVVHHQKHUEHORYHGFLW\EXUQ«9RLFHDQGVSHHFKKDYHQRWDEDQGRQHG
her, nor has reason. Leader of her group of women, she remains a political being. 
With dignity in her humiliation, nobility in her greatest pain, she denounces Greek 
EUXWDOLW\DQGGLYLQHLQGLIIHUHQFH«´117 
 
Nussbaum says that love ³[opens] up a great hole of vulnerability in the self´,118 but as Harris 
tells us, ³to survive by being unloving is to survive by lack of virtue.´119 The critical point 
about dignity of character/dignity as a virtue is not simply that one is disposed ³to respect the 
moral law´ as Nordenfeld puts it, but that one is disposed to do so even in the midst of great 
suffering (³nobility in her greatest pain´). As before, vulnerability is one side of the balance, 
or equilibrium, and integral to what is being valued/respected when we value ³dignified 
character´. Beyleveld and Brownsword emphasise the role of balance in (and the necessity of 
vulnerability to) this sense of dignity as follows: 
 
³the context for the virtue of dignity is one in which humans, confronted with 
adversity (whether social or natural) and the limitations of human finitude, seek to 
balance the will to resist (to overcome) with the will to submit (to accept): in such a 
context, those whose character is attuned to the virtue of human dignity will find an 
appropriate balance.´120 
 
Elsewhere, they express it slightly differently when they say that ³a dignified character [is] 
formed in equipoise between fear of death and hope of God and immortality´. 121  The 
difference between this and the Kantian view of dignity is clear: whereas for Kant dignity 
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involves minimising our vulnerability by attempting to keep that which makes us vulnerable 
(the ³pathological/emotional´) under the governance of reason, on this view dignity is not 
about overcoming vulnerability and adversity (either by overpowering it with reason or by 
any other means) but rather, it is about accepting it to a degree, and striking the best balance 
between the fragile, mortal, material aspects of ourselves and those aspects of us which are 
unbounded, unconfined and (in some sense) immortal.  
Finally, the use of dignity as an ethical principle, or ethical imperative, must be 
considered. In this type of use, ³dignity´ is a claim or instruction about how we ought to treat 
other human beings. Just as dignity requires us to aim for an equilibrium between the material 
and transcendent aspects of our own nature, we are also required to have regard to these 
different aspects in our treatment of other people, and to treat them in ways which heed both 
their material and transcendent needs, without fetishizing or ignoring one or the other. Where 
the equilibrium lies will doubtless vary according to context and circumstance. Those 
responsible for attending to a victim in the immediate aftermath of a serious road traffic 
accident, for example, are right to be concerned primarily (even only) with her obvious 
material, physical needs. A different balancing will be appropriate in observing the dignity of 
an elderly patient with dementia, however; her dignified treatment will consist not only in 
taking care of her material needs ± perhaps including washing, dressing, toileting, assisting 
her participation in activities designed to provide enjoyment and stimulation ± but also in 
caring for more transcendent aspects of her being, for example by performing the 
aforementioned tasks of personal care with sensitivity, by facilitating visits by family and 
friends, by helping her reminisce, or by taking care to treat her as an individual and respect 
and support any residual capacity for choice. The parenting of young children will require a 
balancing of care for material needs, provision of moral guidance, and support for emerging 
independence among other things. In all of these cases, the ethical imperative of dignity ± the 
principle that requires us to ³observe the dignity of others´, or to ³treat others in a dignified 
manner´ ± requires us to strive to achieve the appropriate equilibrium in the circumstances.    
When we use dignity in any of the above senses, or in any sense at all, we are valuing, 
respecting, or admiring something which is an achievement (in the case of conduct or virtue) 
or a property (in the case of dignity as intrinsic worth and dignity as an ethical imperative) of 
vulnerable beings. When I agree with Beyleveld and Brownsword that only vulnerable beings 
can have dignity, however, I do not mean simply that vulnerability is a mere ³background 
condition´ of the good of dignity (to paraphrase Nussbaum), but that it is a necessary and 




Fineman reminds us that vulnerability is ³universal and constant, inherent in the human 
condition´.122 As such, it is of the essence of human dignity that it is the dignity of vulnerable 
beings. As a moral value, what is distinctive about dignity and differentiates it from other 
³grand´ principles of ethics, like autonomy, or sanctity, is not that it responds to the 
vulnerability of all of us ± since all ethical principles and values do that ± but that it gives 
vulnerability a place of honor. My claim here has been that what we value when we invoke 
³dignity´ is a kind of balancing, or equilibrium, which is only valuable, or admirable, 
because we are vulnerable. Moreover, not only is vulnerability a necessary condition without 
which this kind of good would not be possible; it is an essential part of the good of dignity. 
Other ethical principles respond to vulnerability too, but they value entities and actions either 
in spite of vulnerability, regardless of it, or to the extent that it is overcome. Dignity, on the 
other hand, treats vulnerability as a source of value. This, I am claiming, is the ³organizing 
idea´ of human dignity: that all valid uses of ³dignity´ reflect a valuing of the sense in which 
human existence (perhaps uniquely) embodies a union between the fragile/material/finite and 
the transcendent/sublime/immortal. In valuing us because of, and not in spite of / regardless 
of our vulnerability, dignity occupies a unique place in the ethical canon; and once we 
appreciate this, we can begin to ask what distinctive normative contribution ³dignity´ might 
bring to a range of ethical and legal contexts. 
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